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American Indian Tribes 
And 401 {k) Plans 
by Erik M. Jensen 
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Tax Notes recently reported on a letter from Treasury 
Secretary Robert Rubin concluding that American In-
dian tribes are not entitled, under existing law, to es-
tablish 401(k) plans for their employees.1 This is an 
issue that most readers of Tax Notes never will have to 
deal with, but the stakes are real for the affected tribes 
and their employees. Some tribes now have hugely 
successful businesses (such as gaming establishments), 
and they want to offer employees, both tribal members 
and others, benefits comparable to those available in 
the private sector. 
Secretary Rubin and his advisers are wrong, as I 
shall demonstrate in this essay. With basic American 
Indian law principles imported into the analysis of 
relevant Internal Revenue Code provisions, it becomes 
clear that the code does not prohibit tribes from estab-
lishing 401(k) plans. 
I proceed in three steps. The first section of the essay 
sets out the basic statutory framework. Section II dis-
cusses what I think is the real statutory construction 
issue, one that was not addressed in the Rubin letter. 
Finally, section III applies the canons of construction 
applicable in American Indian law to this particular 
issue. It is those canons, which were ignored by 
Secretary Rubin, that remove any doubt about the 
proper result. 
1The letter, dated March 8, 1995, was sent to Sen. Ben 
Nighthorse Campbell, R-Colo., and was noted in Tax Notes, 
Apr. 3, 1995, p. 37. It is available electronically at 95 TNT 
62-61. 
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I. The Statutory Framework 
Subject to some traditional rules in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, section 401{k) precludes a cash or deferred 
arrangement from qualifying under the statute if 
it is part of a plan maintained by-
(i) a state or local government or political sub-
division thereof, or any agency or instrumentality 
thereof, or 
(ii) any organization exempt from tax under 
this subtitle. 2 
The first exception doesn't apply to American In-
dian tribes. Tribes aren't states or local governments; 
they have a distinct constitutional status.3 And 
Secretary Rubin quite properly conceded that nothing 
in the Internal Revenue Code requires treating tribes 
as if they were states for purposes of section 401(k). 
Section 7871 provides that tribes must be treated as 
states in the application of several enumerated code 
sections, but 401{k) isn't one of them. 
Since tribes aren't states, Secretary Rubin instead 
relied on the second exception noted above: a tribe 
can't establish a 401{k) plan, he concluded, because it 
is an "organization exempt from tax under this sub-
title." 
II. The Real Interpretational Issue 
The Rubin position has some superficial plausibility. 
It's true that tribes aren't subject to federal income tax;4 
they are indeed "exempt from tax." But that shouldn't 
be the end of the analysis. It's not at all obvious that 
tribes are "organizations exempt from tax" within the 
meaning of the statute. 
2Section 401(k)(4)(B). 
3Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes." U.S. Canst. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3; see Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831) (Marshall, C.J.) 
("In this clause [tribes] are as clearly contradistinguished by 
a name appropriate to themselves, from foreign nations, as 
from the several states composing the union."). 
4See Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 58 ("The tribe is not 
a taxable entity."); Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law 390 (1982). Query for the future: Should something like 
the tax on unrelated business income apply to tribal revenues 
that are insufficiently connected with core tribal functions? 
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Tribes are nations- not foreign nations, to be sure, 
but nations, as the Supreme Court recognized a long 
time ago.5 The United States must deal with tribes on 
something approaching a government-to-government 
basis.6 
Is the government of a nation an "organization"? 
Most people don't talk that way. I know that if I were 
drafting a statute, I'd pick some other term to refer to 
a governmental body.? I'd reserve use of "organiza-
tion," particularly "organization exempt from tax," for 
nongovernmental entities. 
I Is the government of a nation an Gorganization T? Most people don't talk that way. 
Everyday usage might not be controlling on an in-
terpretational issue like this, but neither is it irrelevant. 
It has particular value when elsewhere in the code the 
use of the terms "organization" and "government" is 
inconsistent. Indeed, the language in other code provi-
sions points in diametric directions. 
For example, section 457 contains the phrase "any 
other organization (other than a governmental unit) 
exempt from tax under this subtitle."8 The parentheti-
cal suggests that the term "organization" might include 
governments. On the other hand, section 42 - to pick 
one section somewhat arbitrarily- uses the terms" or-
ganization" and "government" in a more common 
sense way, as if they referred to different things. 9 
The best way to make some sense ·of the 401(k) ex-
ceptions is to read that section in conjunction with 
section 457. Section 457 permits "eligible employers" 
to establish unfunded deferred compensation plans 
without having to worry about constructive receipt 
issues. An "eligible employer" under section 457 is 
5See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) 
(Marshall, C.J.). 
6See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832). 
I use the qualifying language "approaching" because the 
Supreme Court has long characterized the tribes as "domes tic 
dependent nations_," requiring the protection of the United 
States. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. It is now the case 
that tribes are subject to ultimate federal control under the 
so-called plenary power doctrine. See generally Nell Jessup 
Newton, "Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, 
and Limitations," 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195 (1984). At least in 
theory Congress can change the status of American Indian 
tribes- including terminating the tribes- in a way that it 
can't with foreign nations. 
7In fact, I'm more inclined to think of "disorganization" 
when I think of government. Cf Will Rogers' comment about 
the Democratic Party. 
8Section 457(e)(1)(B). 
9 E.g., sections 42(d)(2)(D)(ii)(III) ("any governmental unit or 
qualified nonprofit organization"); 42(i)(3)(E)(i) ("a State or 
local government or a qualified nonprofit organization"); 
42(m)(1)(C)(v) ("participation by local tax-exempt organiza-
tions"). 
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(A) a State, political subdivision of a State, and 
any agency or instrumentality of a State or politi-
cal subdivision of a State, and 
(B) any other organization (other than a gov-
ernmental unit) exempt from tax under this sub-
title.10 
In short, eligible employers under section 457 
generally are those that can't establish 401(k) plans.· 
The effect of the definition of "eligible employer," 
when coupled with the exceptions in section 401(k),11 
is to remove state and local governments and tax-
exempt nongovernmental entities from the scope of 
401(k) and put them into 457; those bodies can create 
unfunded, deferred compensation plans under section 
457, but can't have 401{k) salary reduction plans. In 
general, assuming other statutory requirements are 
met, employers ought to fit within either section 401(k) 
or section 457, but not bothP 
But Secretary Rubin's reading leaves American In-
dian tribes, which are made up of American citizens, 
out in the cold. A tribe clearly is a "governmental unit" 
other than a state or locality, so it's not an "eligible 
employer" under section 457. And Secretary Rubin con-
cluded that 401(k) also is unavailable to a tribe. 
In Secretary Rubin's defense, I must admit it doesn't 
help the case for tribal 401(k) plans that section 457 
includes the parenthetical "other than a governmental 
unit" to qualify the word "organization," while the 
equivalent language in section 401(k) includes no such 
qualificationP Read narrowly, without regard to 
statutory purpose, the relevant la.nguage in both sec-
tions therefore can be interpreted to exclude American 
Indian tribes.l4 And one would like to think that Con-
gress, in amending sections 401 (k) and 457 in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986,15 carefully crafted the slightly 
different language in the two provisions with some 
overriding principle in mind. 
10Section 457(e)(1). In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Con-
gress added clause (B), for the. following reason: 
Congress believed that it was inappropriate to 
apply constructive receipt principles to employees of 
nongovernmental tax-exempt entities, thereby 
precluding their ability to establish deferred compen-
sation arrangements on a salary reduction basis, while 
permitting salary reductions for certain employees of 
governments and taxable entities. 
1986 Bluebook at 653-54. At the same time, Congress added 
section 401(k)(4)(B), as quoted in the text accompanying note 2: 
The Act prohibits tax-exempt organizations and 
State and local governments (or a political subdivision 
of a State or local government) from establishing qual-
ified cash or deferred arrangements. 
1986 Bluebook at 642. 
11 As set out in the text accompanying note 2. 
12It's not my purpose here to exrlore the differences be-
tween 401(k) and 457 plans- why, i it were entirely a matter 
of choice, an employer or a group of employees might prefer 
one type of plan over another. 
13The Secretary didn't make this point, but he could have. 
14I don't mean to suggest this is a necessary reading, but 
it is a possible one. 
15See supra note 10. 
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One would like to think that, but I can see no such 
overriding principle. What purpose is served by 
making both 401(k) and 457 plans unavailable to tribes, 
even though one or the other is potentially available 
to most other employers? In particular, what is the 
reason for treating tribes less favorably than state and 
local governments? I don't know, and apparently 
Secretary Rubin doesn't either. He gave no policy jus-
tification for singling tribes out in this way, and in fact 
there's nothing in the legislative history of the 1986 
changes to sections 401(k) and 457 that mentions tribes. 
Whatever Congress did in 1986, it didn't explicitly ad-
dress the status of American Indian tribes. Congress 
therefore could not have mandated the result that 
Secretary Rubin said is required by the language of 
section 401(k). 
On the basis of this statutory analysis, I have little 
difficulty in concluding that tribes may establish 401(k) 
plans. But I concede there's some uncertainty. The 
question then becomes: What's the effect of statutory 
ambiguity when American Indian tribes are involved? 
III. Canons of Construction in American Indian Law 
In fact, there's a lot of learning and authority, in-
cluding a well-developed set of canons of construction, 
on how to deal with ambiguity in American Indian law. 
In general, the canons have been described as follows: 
"(1) very liberal construction to determine whether In-
dian rights exist, and (2) very strict construction to 
determine whether Indian rights are to be abridged or 
abrogated."16 Congress has the power to limit tribal 
prerogatives, but it must do so unequivocally. If there's 
doubt about the language in a treaty, a statute, or a 
regulation, the doubt must be resolved in a way 
favorable to the affected tribe. It would not be over-
stating matters much to say that in such circumstances, 
the tribe's position prevails. 
Secretary Rubin made no reference to the applicable 
canons, and that's a fatal flaw in his analysis. Applying 
the canons is not a matter of secretarial discretion. 17 
Yes, the 401(k) issue is not a typical "Indian rights" 
question: it has little or nothing to do with traditional 
tribal rights, and it affects tribes more in their 
capacities as employers than it does in their capacities 
as sovereigns. But a fundamental issue remains: 
whether tribes should be treated less generously for 
federal income tax purposes than other bodies, includ-
ing other American governmental bodies. Without a 
specific, unequivocal congressional directive on the 
matter- and surely use of the phrase "organization 
exempt from tax" is not that - the answer must be 
"no." 
* * * * * 
The Rubin letter noted that, if it had been enacted, 
legislation introduced in the last Congress (H.R. 3419) 
16David H. Getches et al., Federal Indian Law: Cases and 
Materials 348 (3d ed. 1993). 
17Q . h 
, UI~e t e contrary. As a trustee for the tribes - the 
domestic dependent nations," see supra note 6 - the federal 
government has the obligation to protect tribal interests. 
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would have had the effect of permitting tribes to estab-
lish 401(k) plans, and Congress can act now to get that 
result. That's a straightforward way to do away with 
the interpretational problem, and the secretary ex-
pressed support for such a change. 18 But Congress 
shouldn't have to act to "restore" tribal powers that 
never were taken away. 
The Role of ETis in Pension 
Investments - Implications of 
H.R. 1594 and S. 774 
by Stanley G. Oshinsky 
For years, private and public pension plans have 
invested billions of dollars back into their local com-
munities in what are termed "economically targeted 
investments" (ETis). Now, a bill introduced in the 
House and the Senate, as H.R. 1594 and S. 774, respec-
tively, would place new restrictions on the powers of 
pension fund investment advisers to make ETis. The 
bill is championed by Rep. Jim Saxton, R-N.J., and 
endorsed by the House Republican leadership. The ra-
tionale for introducing this bill is a perception that the 
solvency of the $4.8 trillion retirement system is at risk 
due to ETis. 
I If the bill is enacte~ a Department of Labor interpretative bulletin and 15 years of DOL advisory opinions allowing ETis would be nullified. 
If the bill is enacted, a Department of Labor inter-
pretative bulletin and 15 years of DOL advisory 
opinions allowing ETis would be nullified. The DOL 
has consistently ruled that investment advisers are per-
mitted to consider the collateral benefits of an invest-
ment, when choosing between investments that have 
comparable risks and comparable expected rates of 
return. These benefits :include whether the investment 
promotes economic growth, job creation, or infrastruc-
ture development. If the bill is enacted, investment 
advisers of private pension funds would potentially 
violate federal law and be held personally liable for 
any ETis they finance. 
JBI'We should be very interested in working with you [Sen. 
Campbell] on expanding the availability of section 401(k) 
plans to tribal government employees." 
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